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Viewpoints: Privacy & Security 
 
Against Cyberterrorism 
Why cyber-based terrorist attacks are unlikely to occur 
 
Like the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, the October 2010 Stuxnet botnet attack 
on Iranian nuclear facilities made cyber-based attacks global news. The Estonian 
attacks were largely labeled a cyberwar by journalists, although some did invoke the 
concept of cyberterrorism. The Stuxnet attack, on the other hand, has been very 
widely described as cyberterrorism, including by the Iranian government. 
 
Cyberterrorism is a concept that appears recurrently in contemporary media. It is not 
just reported upon in newspapers and on television, but is also the subject of movies 
(such as 1990’s Die Hard II and 2007’s Die Hard IV: Live Free or Die Hard) and 
popular fiction books (for example, Winn Schwartau’s 2002 novel Pearl Harbor Dot 
Com). This coverage is particularly interesting if one believes, as I do, that no act of 
cyberterrorism has ever yet occurred and is unlikely to at any time in the near future. 
Having said that, it is almost always portrayed in the press as either having already 
occurred or being just around the corner. As an academic, I’m not alone in arguing 
that no act of cyberterrorism has yet occurred and, indeed, some journalists agree; 
most, however, seem convinced as to the salience of this threat. Why? 
 
I can only surmise that, just as a large amount of social psychological research has 
shown, the uncertain and the unknown generally produce fear and anxiety. This is the 
psychological basis of an effective movie thriller: the fear is greatest when you 
suspect something, but you’re not certain what it is. The term “cyberterrorism” unites 
two significant modern fears: fear of technology and fear of terrorism. Fear of 
terrorism, though the likelihood of any one of us being the victim of terrorism is 
statistically insignificant, has become perhaps normalized; but fear of technology? In 
fact, for those unfamiliar with the workings of complex technologies, these are 
perceived as arcane, unknowable, abstract, and yet increasingly powerful and 
ubiquitous. Many people therefore fear that technology will become the master and 
humankind the servant. Couple this relatively new anxiety with age-old fears 
associated with apparently random violence and the result is a truly heightened state 
of alarm. Many journalists—although fewer technology journalists than others— have 
succumbed, like members of the general population, to these fears, to which the 
journalists have then added further fuel with their reporting. 
 
The Definition Issue 
The second stumbling block for journalists is that just as the definition of terrorism is 
fraught, so too is the definition of cyberterrorism. My preference is to distinguish 
between cyberterrorism and terrorist use of the Net. This is the distinction FBI 
Director Robert Mueller seemed implicitly to be drawing in a March 2010 speech in 
which he stated that “the Internet is not only used to plan and execute attacks; it is a 
target in and of itself…We in the FBI, with our partners in the intelligence 
community, believe the cyber terrorism threat is real, and it is rapidly expanding.”a 
Where the FBI Director and I diverge is in the efficacy of the cyberterrorist threat as 
opposed to that of everyday terrorist use of the Net (that is, for radicalization, 
researching and planning, financing, and other purposes). 
 
Dorothy Denning’s definitions of cyberterrorism are probably the most well known 
and respected. Her most recent attempt at defining cyberterrorism is: “…[H]ighly 
damaging computer-based attacks or threats of attack by non-state actors against 
information systems when conducted to intimidate or coerce governments or societies 
in pursuit of goals that are political or social. It is the convergence of terrorism with 
cyberspace, where cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. 
Rather than committing acts of violence against persons or physical property, the 
cyberterrorist commits acts of destruction or disruption against digital property.”(2) 
 
Analyses of cyberterrorism can be divided into two broad categories on the basis of 
where the producers stand on the definition issue: those who agree broadly with 
Denning versus those who wish to incorporate not just use, but a host of other 
activities into the definition. The literature can also be divided on the basis of where 
the authors stand on the magnitude of the cyberterrorism threat. Dunn-Cavelty uses 
the term “Hypers” to describe those who believe a cyberterrorist attack is not just 
likely, but imminent,b and the term “De-Hypers” to describe those who believe such 
an attack is unlikely.(1) Most journalists are hypers, on the other hand I’m 
emphatically a de-hyper. In this column, I lay out the three major reasons why. 
 
Three Arguments Against Cyberterrorism 
In my opinion, the three most compelling arguments against cyberterrorism are: 
 The argument of Technological Complexity; 
 The argument regarding 9/11 and the Image Factor; and 
 The argument regarding 9/11 and the Accident Issue. 
The first argument is treated in the academic literature; the second and third 
arguments are not, but ought to be. None of these are angles to which journalists 
appear to have devoted a lot of thought or given adequate consideration. 
 
In the speech mentioned earlier, FBI Director Mueller observed “Terrorists have 
shown a clear interest in pursuing hacking skills. And they will either train their own 
recruits or hire outsiders, with an eye toward combining physical attacks with cyber 
attacks.” That may very well be true, but the argument from Technological 
Complexity underlines that ‘wanting’ to do something is quite different from having 
the ability to do the same. Here’s why: 
 
Violent jihadis’ IT knowledge is not superior. For example, in research carried out in 
2007, it was found that of a random sampling of 404 members of violent Islamist 
groups, 196 (48.5%) had a higher education, with information about subject areas 
available for 178 individuals. Of these 178, some 8 (4.5%) had trained in computing, 
                                                 
a The text of Director Mueller’s March 2010 speech at a cyber security conference in San Francisco is 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller030410.htm.  
b See, for an exemplary example, journalist Dan Verton’s Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyberterrorism. 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 2003. 
which means that out of the entire sample, less than 2% of the jihadis came from a 
computing background.(3) And not even these few could be assumed to have mastery 
of the complex systems necessary to carry out a successful cyberterrorist attack. 
 
Real-world attacks are difficult enough. What are often viewed as relatively 
unsophisticated real-world attacks undertaken by highly educated individuals are 
routinely unsuccessful. One only has to consider the failed car bomb attacks planned 
and carried out by medical doctors in central London and at Glasgow airport in June 
2007. 
 
Hiring hackers would compromise operational security. The only remaining option is 
to retain “outsiders” to undertake such an attack. This is very operationally risky. It 
would force the terrorists to operate outside their own circles and thus leave them ripe 
for infiltration. Even if they successfully got in contact with “real” hackers, they 
would be in no position to gauge their competency accurately; they would simply 
have to trust in same. This would be very risky. 
 
So on the basis of technical knowhow alone cyberterror attack is not imminent, but 
this is not the only factor one must take into account. The events of Sept. 11, 2001 
underscore that for a true terrorist event spectacular moving images are crucial. The 
attacks on the World Trade Center were a fantastic piece of performance violence; 
look back on any recent roundup of the decade and mention of 9/11 will not just be 
prominent, but pictures will always be provided.  
 
The problem with respect to cyberterrorism is that many of the attack scenarios put 
forward, from shutting down the electric power grid to contaminating a major water 
supply, fail on this account: they are unlikely to have easily captured, spectacular 
(live, moving) images associated with them, something we—as an audience—have 
been primed for by the attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11.  
 
The only cyberterrorism scenario that would fall into this category is interfering with 
air traffic control systems to crash planes, but haven’t we seen that planes can much 
more easily be employed in spectacular“real-world” terrorism? And besides, aren’t all 
the infrastructures just mentioned much easier and more spectacular to simply blow 
up? It doesn’t end there, however. For me, the third argument against cyberterrorism 
is perhaps the most compelling; yet it is very rarely mentioned. 
 
In 2004, Howard Schmidt, former White House Cybersecurity Coordinator, remarked 
to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding Nimda and Code Red that 
“we to this day don’t know the source of that. It could have very easily been a 
terrorist.”(4) This observation betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature 
and purposes of terrorism, particularly its attention-getting and communicative 
functions. 
 
A terrorist attack with the potential to be hidden, portrayed as an accident, or 
otherwise remain unknown is unlikely to be viewed positively by any terrorist group. 
In fact, one of the most important aspects of the 9/11 attacks in New York from the 
perpetrators viewpoint was surely the fact that while the first plane to crash into the 
World Trade Center could have been accidental, the appearance of the second plane 
confirmed the incident as a terrorist attack in real time. Moreover, the crash of the 
first plane ensured a large audience for the second plane as it hit the second tower. 
 
Alternatively, think about the massive electric failure that took place in the 
northeastern U.S. in August 2003: if it was a terrorist attack—and I’m not suggesting 
that it was—but if it was, it would have been a spectacular failure. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the high cost—not just in terms of money, but also time, commitment, and 
effort—and the high possibility of failure on the basis of manpower issues, timing, 
and complexity of a potential cyberterrorist attack, the costs appear to me to still very 
largely outweigh the potential publicity benefits. The publicity aspect is crucial for 
potential perpetrators of terrorism and so the possibility that an attack may be 
apprehended or portrayed as an accident, which would be highly likely with regard to 
cyberterrorism, is detrimental. Add the lack of spectacular moving images and it is 
my belief that cyberterrorism, regardless of what you may read in newspapers, see on 
television, or obtain via other media sources, is not in our near future. 
 
So why then the persistent treatment of cyberterrorism on the part of journalists? 
Well, in this instance, science fiction-type fears appear to trump rational calculation 
almost every time. And I haven’t even begun to discuss how the media discourse has 
clearly influenced the pronouncements of policymakers.c 
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